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UNFOCUSED GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTSt
Robert F. Nagel*
My subject is "unfocused governmental interests," or what might
be loosely thought of as diffuse or general moral objectives. Most of
my paper is a discussion of two opinions with which you are all prob-
ably familiar. One is Justice William Brennan's dissenting opinion in
Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton.1 The other is the Court's opinion in
Texas v. Johnson,2 the flag burning case. I plan to just summarize my
observations about those two opinions and then try to quickly put
those observations in a more general perspective.
I chose those opinions because they were written by the foremost
modern practitioner of doctrinal analysis. Justice Brennan's recent
retirement from the bench, I think, makes this an opportune time to
think further about the rhetorical functions of doctrinal analysis.
Such an effort might help develop some perspective on the Court's
impending changes of direction. Ironically, Justice Brennan's disap-
proval of unfocused governmental interests, upon analysis, turns out
to be a somewhat reassuring prospect from which to view the ending
of an era of judicial power that he did so much to shape.
One of the main consequences of doctrinalism in constitutional
law, in my judgment anyway, is to mask or submerge the significant
considerations at work in judicial decisions. Doctrinalism makes ani-
mating visions, hopes and fears hard to see; it hints at these consider-
ations while making them seem routine or ordinary, analytic and def-
inite. There are many reasons to expect the Court to choose a form of
expression that masks the important considerations underlying its
judgments. The particular reason that I am going to address is this:
the important interests that are at work in judicial decisions, at least
some of the time, are indistinguishable from the sorts of interests
that the federal courts often find to be suspicious when asserted by
t 0 1992 by Robert F. Nagel. These remarks were based on a paper prepared for the
Conference on Compelling Government Interests at Albany Law School, September 26-28,
1991. The full paper, on which these remarks were based, is scheduled to appear in a volume
tentatively entitled Compelling Government Interests: The Mystery of Constitutional
Analysis (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.) to be published by the University of Michigan Press.
* Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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the other branches and layers of government. Since the Court's in-
dictment of other decisionmakers applies to its own decisions, it is
only natural for opinions to be written in language that obscures sig-
nificant objectives and concerns.
When Justice Brennan employed the adjective "unfocused" in his
dissent in Paris Adult Theatre, he was describing the governmental
interest asserted to justify a prohibition against adults viewing ob-
scene films in commercial theaters.' Having just acknowledged that
states have the authority to regulate not only health and safety, but
also "the morality of the community,"4 Brennan quickly distin-
guished the moral objectives behind suppressing obscenity as "ill de-
fined" and "speculative." 5 The state's interest in regulating morality
is, he argued, lawful, but inadequate to justify the suppression of ob-
scenity.6 In contrast, what he called "strong and legitimate inter-
ests"-perhaps the welfare of children or the privacy of
adults-might justify controls over the method of distribution of ob-
scene material.7
The distinction between "unfocused" interests and "strong" inter-
ests, then, was a tentative effort to establish a hierarchy of public
purposes. The word "unfocused" was part of a justification for the
relatively low legal weight that Justice Brennan would assign to the
state interests behind at least certain "moral" regulations. Brennan's
discussion emphasizes the intangible and uncertain kinds of conse-
quences that can be traced to exposure to obscenity. There is " 'little
empirical basis,'" he said, for a causal connection between obscenity
and sexual deviance or crimes.' It is only "speculative" that re-
pressing obscenity would build a moral community and, in any event,
the idea of a moral community is "ill defined."9 These aspects of
Brennan's opinion assume that the state's important moral interests
involved "real" consequences and specific behavior.
Despite what Justice Brennan says or assumes, I cannot see why
unfocused moral interests are unimportant. You can immediately
think of important moral interests, such as enhancing individual self-
respect, training vigorous and responsible citizens, and creating beau-
tiful cities, that are intangible or uncertain or vague. Moreover, you
' Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 109 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 108-09.
' Id. at 109.
6 Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 107-08 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1968)).
6 Id. at 109.
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can think of unimportant moral purposes, such as mending pot
holes-although some people, I suppose, would probably think that
mending pot holes is as important as anything else-that are tangi-
ble, specific and certain. These counter examples exist for obvious
and intrinsic reasons. Social consequences can be morally important
by virtue of their diffuseness. Think of the countless acts of kindness
and usefulness that flow from the inculcation, in a single individual,
of character traits like tolerance, responsibility, or pride. Moreover, it
can be because a social consequence is morally important that the
uncertainty of its realization may not matter decisively. I think that
everyone knows this who has supported controversial programs to
eradicate poverty or to achieve racial equality, or to make any major
change in society. Further, profound moral issues, such as when one
human life begins or whether the death penalty is ever justified, tend
to involve great controversy partly as a result of their moral
significance.
Although Justice Brennan used the term "unfocused" as a way of
grading the importance of state interests, the term only makes sense,
I think, if it is understood in quite a different way. Justice Brennan
could have fully acknowledged that the interests credited by the ma-
jority opinion in Paris Adult Theatre were morally important. If he
had done so he still could have taken the following position: Both the
suppression of obscenity and obscenity itself entail profoundly bad
consequences. However, when the justifications for suppressing ob-
scenity are "unfocused," the side effects of suppression threaten to
become widespread and to engulf us as a society. This is because the
kinds of state interests asserted for suppressing obscenity can always
or almost always be asserted. The advantage of "focused" interests is
simply that, by definition, they can be convincingly asserted only
sometimes. Not every obscenity regulation, for instance, is designed
to protect children, but every suppression of obscenity (indeed, every
suppression of any offensive communication) can be justified on the
basis of the "moral character of the community."
It is this familiar argument against boundless justifications that
gives force to Justice Brennan's use of the word "unfocused." It is
possible to extrapolate from Brennan's bleak depiction of the side
effects created by prosecutions under the Roth obscenity standard 0
to a nightmare image of widespread timidity and arbitrary prosecu-
tions, where valuable ideas and information about sexuality never see
the light of day. If, on the other hand, obscenity regulation is permit-
o See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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ted only when interests in privacy or child welfare are demonstrable,
pervasive suppression, along with its nightmarish consequences, be-
comes less likely. The advantage of focused justifications, then, is not
their moral superiority, but their infrequency. The side effects of ob-
scenity regulation are more unacceptable than the effects of obscen-
ity, not because these side effects in themselves are worse morally,
but because they are likely to expand to unacceptable proportions.
As congenial and common as such a prediction or such a fear might
be, it seems to me that it is important to ask what it could be based
on. It is possible that, as a psychological matter, the inclination to
suppress is strong and can always be expected to expand to the limits
defined by the courts. Or, perhaps, there are specific political and
institutional characteristics of our time that make widening suppres-
sions likely. Possibly, a perceptive eye can see, in our society, indica-
tions that suppression is already unexpectedly common. Even if sup-
pression is still acceptably contained, a clairvoyant insight might
reveal that soon society will undergo a sharp change of direction to-
ward general suppression.
Under the dry word "unfocused," then, we can barely make out an
intimidatingly large form, a fearful image of an arbitrary and sterile
society. Many people besides Justice Brennan see such a society tak-
ing shape around us, and for such people Brennan's dissent in Paris
Adult Theatre will seem compelling. The power in his argument de-
pends, however, not on the words or the doctrines but on an animat-
ing vision that is only suggested. Given the terms of Brennan's argu-
ment, this vision had to be kept obscure for the simple reason that it
amounts to the assertion of an unfocused interest. Just as there is no
conclusive proof of a causal connection between obscenity and sex
crimes, there is no firm proof that the Roth standard resulted in any
significant blockage of the flow of sexual information- to the public,
much less that loosening the Roth standard would unleash any
frightful wave of obscenity prosecutions. Potential publishers' pre-
sumed timidity is intangible in the same sense that the effects of ob-
scenity on family relationships and individuals' self-respect are intan-
gible. The precise contours of any predicted general repression are
necessarily undefined for the same reasons that the damage done by
obscenity to the moral character of the community is, as Justice
Brennan argued, only vaguely defined. Indeed, the grim society that
he sought to avert by limiting the states' authority to regulate ob-
scenity might as well be described as a different version of a society
without moral character, listless as opposed to prurient, cautious
rather than reckless, repressed instead of libertine. Put affirmatively,
[Vol. 55
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Brennan's position was fashioned to improve the moral character of
the community by building a vigorous, experimental, individualistic
ethos among its people.
As morally attractive as this purpose is, it is boundless. A society
that is permitted to suppress obscenity only for the sake of adult pri-
vacy and children's welfare could be engulfed by prurient materials.
A person fearful of this possibility might imagine obscenity appearing
not only in downtown commercial theaters but in outdoor drive-in
theaters, on bumper stickers, in municipal parks, in public libraries,
on late-night television, in popular recorded music; that is, virtually
everywhere that unpleasant speech might be anticipated or from
which the eye could be averted. What might underlie such a fear or
prediction? As a psychological matter, it might be supposed that sex-
uality is an enormously powerful force that can be expected to gener-
ate a limitless market. There may be cultural and institutional weak-
nesses specific to our time that make commercial exploitation of
obscenity especially lucrative. A perceptive eye might already see in
our society indications that obscenity, or something like obscenity, is
disturbingly prevalent. Even if our present culture is largely free of
obscenity, some prophetic insight might accurately predict a sudden
and pervasive change.
In summary then, the operative effect of using the word "un-
focused" in Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre, was, paradoxi-
cally, to hint at the diffuse visions that animated and gave force to
Brennan's position, while simultaneously discrediting the unfocused
objectives underlying the state's position. If Brennan's language had
been more powerfully expressive, it would have been clear that what
was at stake was two competing sets of hopes and fears: differing
images of potential calamities and virtuous communities.
When we examine Brennan's opinion for the Court in the flag
burning case, we see much the same dynamic at work.1" Most of this
opinion is devoted to convincing the reader that invalidation of the
Texas flag desecration statute was required by the prosaic application
of legal doctrine rather than by any grand social vision. The key to
the opinion, however, is the Court's treatment of the governmental
interest asserted by Texas. That interest or purpose was to
"preserv[e] the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity.' 2
Now, it would be easy to misunderstand the Court's decision as hold-
ing that this purpose is an illegitimate effort to suppress speech that
" See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 407.
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is disrespectful of our nationhood. The opinion does describe the
state's purpose as "content-based" and repeatedly invokes the princi-
ple that government "may not prohibit expression simply because it
disagrees with its message."'" Nevertheless, none of this is used to
establish that Texas's objective was improper. Rather, the Court con-
cludes only that the asserted interest must be subject to something it
calls "'the most exacting scrutiny""' and that it must involve some
consideration other than "simply" protecting society from offensive
or disagreeable ideas.15 The promotion of nationhood, obviously, is an
objective that goes far beyond protecting the public's sensibilities
from distasteful or dissenting views, and the Court itself flatly de-
scribes this objective as legitimate.16 Why, then, was the Texas law
not constitutional?
At this point in his analysis, Justice Brennan's dilemma is parallel
to the dilemma he had faced years earlier on the obscenity issue. In
both instances, he conceded that the conduct involved can be regu-
lated by the government if some heightened level of scrutiny reveals
a sufficiently important public interest, and in both he described the
asserted state interest as legitimate. His route out in the flag burning
case is over the same path that he had marked in Paris Adult
Theatre. Although the word does not appear in the decision, notice
that Texas was asserting an "unfocused" interest. Like the moral
character of a community, nationhood is an abstraction, a self-
perception, a pervasive sense. It does not consist of acts, but of the
meaning attributed to acts; it is not a program, but an identity based
on history, imagination, and sentiment. Nationhood, of course, does
have tangible consequences, but they are diffuse, diverse, and uncer-
tain. National unity, therefore, is a boundless justification. It could
be promoted by protecting the flag, but, as Justice Brennan points
out, it could also be promoted by sanctifying the presidential seal or
copies of the Constitution. The image that looms at the end of this
slide is ominous indeed; it is the image of totalitarian orthodoxy. If
we can be forced to treat a flag with respect, we can be forced to
express false agreement with public policies and false homage to gov-
* ernmental leaders.
Against this depressing image, the Court sets its own vision of self-
assurance and tolerance. "The way to preserve the flag's special role
is not to punish those who feel differently .... It is to persuade them
" Id. at 416.
" Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
" Id. at 414.
16 Id. at 418.
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that they are wrong. '17 Justice Brennan's opinion says that the flag
represents "the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity.""8 It appeals to
"'courageous, self-reliant men.' '" The Court could imagine "no
more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's own,
no better way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting the
flag that burns. 2
0
This vision of a tolerant society is appealing, but like the image of
a society brave enough or licentious enough to risk having obscenity
nearly everywhere, this objective is unfocused. Its boundless pos-
sibilities are unwittingly evoked by the image of citizens saluting
while their country symbolically burns in the street. The people are
instructed to wave their flags back and forth as they watch the em-
blem of their common heritage being burned or, presumably, walked
over or urinated on. Self-confidence, as much as unity, is an answer
that can always be given; as unity at the extreme turns to totalitarian
force, resilience at its extreme turns to entropy. It would seem, then,
that again we have a choice of nightmares: a society without toler-
ance and variety, or a society without commonality and self-respect.
Just as in Paris Adult Theatre, however, Justice Brennan insists
that the interests he prefers are focused. He writes, "We do not con-
secrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute
the freedom that this cherished emblem represents."" This claim,
however, is undercut by Justice Brennan's depiction of the Court's
opinion itself; he plainly sees his opinion as a substitute for the sym-
bolism of the flag. He writes, "Our decision is a reaffirmation of the
principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects. ...
[A]nd it is that resilience [represented by the flag surviving the bom-
bardment a Fort McHenry] that we reassert today."22 This is to say
that national unity, correctly understood, is symbolized and pro-
tected by the Court's opinion in Texas v. Johnson.
In short, the Court presents its opinion as an alternative to flag
desecration laws. For the visual symbolism, the emotional connota-
tions, the historical associations of the flag, the Court would substi-
tute its teachings, its discussion of precedent, its doctrinal analysis,
and its claims about self-confidence and resilience. This means,
among other things, that the interest of the State of Texas could not
" Id. at 419.
18 Id.
Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
20 Id. at 420.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 419.
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have been inadequate or illegitimate because it was unfocused or
symbolic. If the state's interest was insufficient on this ground, under
the Court's view of the purpose of its own opinion, that opinion
would also have to be unimportant or improper.
The distinction in Texas v. Johnson between substantive princi-
ples of freedom and the symbols that represent those freedoms is the
same distinction that Justice Brennan made in Paris Adult Theatre
when he contrasted legitimate state interests with unfocused moral
objectives. In both cases, however, his opinions end up asserting a
judicial version of an unfocused interest. Indeed, in the latter case,
Brennan's opinion for the Court substitutes an intellectualized ver-
sion of a national mythology for a visual one, and he thus audaciously
pursues symbolic interests that are identical to those of the State of
Texas.
National unity built on a shining vision of tolerant, flag-waving
people is both possible and attractive. But it is also possible that
unity, including vigorous commitment to individual freedom, de-
pends less on reason than on sentiment, less on doctrine than on his-
tory. If so, Brennan's vision at its end might convert a political ethos
that is vigorous and proud into one that is feckless and empty.
I can now state in more general terms the propositions that are
illustrated by the two opinions that I have been discussing. Viewing
constitutional cases as struggles between competing social images,
rather than merely arguments about principle and doctrine, can re-
store some sense of authenticity and significance. By emphasizing the
extent to which the Court's decisions serve controversial aspirations
and fears, this perspective forces attention to an important equiva-
lence between judicial and other governmental interests. To the ex-
tent that both sets of interests are unfocused, both are boundless jus-
tifications. This means that both sets of interests entail potentially
serious risks. Moreover, to the extent that the constitutional status of
the judicial interests depends on the alleged insufficiency of the com-
peting governmental interest, the boundlessness of the judicial inter-
est undercuts any special claims it might have to legal
authoritativeness.
As I have tried to demonstrate, Brennan's two opinions deny the
equivalence between his preferred interests and those of the govern-
ment. To the extent that the Court adopts this strategy when it de-
clares a governmental interest to be vague and potentially boundless,
the judiciary is vulnerable on the very charge that it directs at the
political branches. Indeed, in some ways the judiciary is more vulner-
,able; not only are the Court's justifications, if they were fully ex-
[Vol. 55
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pressed, patently boundless in theory, but judicial opinions almost
necessarily betray a tendency to apply them to excess in practice.
To see why this might be, consider the consequences of the asser-
tion that the Court's imagery in a particular case has authoritative
status. Given our assumptions about the Constitution as supreme
law, constitutional prescriptions must apply uniformally across the
nation and must subordinate all other interests. To the extent that
an objective has authoritative constitutional status, judges are re-
quired to 'realize that objective everywhere and at all costs. That is to
say, as justifications, judicial objectives are boundless.
The boundless pursuit of a social vision requires a lot more than
this, of course. It requires what you might call inspiration, what you
might call fanaticism, at least dogmatism. There is no doubt that
most federal judges, most of the time, are the opposite of fanatical;
they are usually moderate, thoughtful, and tolerant. Does this mean
that the unfocused interest pursued by the court should never be ex-
pected to present a realistic threat of boundless application? Most
citizens, most of the time, are not fanatics; but the American body
politic is not entirely immune from excessive zeal and pathological
moods. There is no reason that I know of to think that jurists, espe-
cially when fired by the conviction that they are performing an ines-
capable duty, should be any different. Brennan's opinions, then, raise
questions that should be assessed openly and carefully. Under what
circumstances are federal judges, like others in power, capable of ob-
duracy and even, in their own way, of fanaticism? Might they push,
or have they pushed, their boundless justifications to end-points
where pleasing images dissolve into painful excesses?
The society that Justice Brennan would create is thought by many
not only to be morally attractive but also to be legallyimperative. In
that imagined society, virtually all acts expressing defiance are pro-
tected as speech. People hide from or are inured to the clamor of
offensive communications and sexually explicit materials; church and
state are separated by a high and mostly impregnable wall; gender
differentiation has been eliminated; abortion is freely available; sex-
ual freedoms have been extended to minors and to the unmarried;
and the institution of marriage has withered into legal insignificance.
For many judges and for many legal academics, this world, or some-
thing like it, marks the limit of imagination and tolerance. In this
there is a dogmatism that doctrinalism dignifies and obscures.
Recognizing this should affect how we react during periods of re-
trenchment on the Court, such as the one we are now entering. The
Court is now slowing or stopping what otherwise would have been its
1992]
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own pursuit of boundless images. Given the reasons to expect rigidity
and intolerance among our judges, it ought to be reassuring that the
massive power exercised by the federal judiciary can, at least over the
course of decades, be qualified and redirected through political
checks.
On the other hand, perhaps, the new Court can be expected to
deprecate progressive legislative or executive objectives as potentially
boundless, while obscuring its own agenda of unfocused interests.
This might occur under a number of circumstances, the most obvious
being the cynical possibility that the asymmetrical evaluation of pub-
lic purposes is simply a method of institutional or ideological aggran-
dizement. It could also occur on other assumptions: for example, that
a politically conservative Court nonetheless will continue to be cap-
tive to the instrumentalist assumptions of modern individualism; or
that the tradition of doctrinal justification will remain strong and will
itself tend to suppress the articulation of animating visions; or that
other, inherent aspects of the judicial function discourage candid
communication. No matter what the cause, it would be both ironic
and unfortunate if the newly constituted Court were to follow Justice
Brennan's lead in ignoring the simple truth that all unfocused gov-
ernmental interests should be identified and evaluated for what they
are.
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